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ABSTRACT : This paper analyzes the development of industrial cooperation in space 
activities since the end of World War II. It highlights a gradual emancipation of 
space companies’ industrial cooperation and strategies from governmental 
programs (II). In the recent years, this emancipation results in the proliferation of 
numerous Joint Venture agreements (III) and in a significant number of mergers 
and/or acquisitions exceeding $ 500 million (IV). These transactions or JVs have 
caused a consolidation trend in the space industry, now structured differently 
around subcontractors of first, second and sometimes, third tiers ; space 
subcontractors whose business generates financing needs that exceed their cash 
resources and of which the increasing number calls for industry consolidation (V). 
These financing requirements and the need for consolidation could be a factor of 
vulnerability of space industry in a speculative context where the space industry 
combines numerous factors of attractiveness for investors (companies, funds) (VI), 
raising the crucial question of the effectiveness of the control systems implemented 
by states in the field of concentrations, foreign investment or exports of dual-use 
technologies (VII). A conclusion brings some recommendations that can be made in 
such a context (VIII). 
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Recently, we have seen a proliferation of subsidiaries’ sales by large space industry groups, particularly in 
favor of private equity funds. In March 2016, Airbus Group has finalized the sale of its subsidiary in defense 
electronics to the US fund KKR (after a short competition between KKR and Carlyle) and Safran announced it 
was separating from its subsidiary, Morpho3. 
 
In each of these two transactions, the arguments are the same. Sellers groups indicate that the electronic 
defense sector became very competitive, requiring large investments that exceed their financing capacity. 
Moreover, they argue that their objectives are now to focus on their respective core businesses, hoping to 
compensate by contracts of outsourcing, the loss of power that gave them their control position as 
shareholders of companies sold. The acquiring funds are looking forward to setting up buy and build 
strategies in a very attractive economics context from a financial perspective. 
 
These operations are the opposite of the traditional image of vertically integrated space groups, operating 
on sovereign markets, dependent on major space programs inspired and funded by states. They suggest on 
the contrary that these large groups are pursuing strategies that fit into a relatively open market of which 
the states are no longer the only dominant players.  
 
This could result in some vulnerability of the space sector to takeover operations somehow "creeping"; all 
the more so as 2015 was a record year in terms of mergers-acquisitions worldwide with a total amount of 
transactions of 4,400 billion US dollars4, including three transactions for more than 100 billion US dollars5. 
With transactions finally regaining momentum, 2015 exceeded the robust pre-2007 financial crisis levels6 in 
terms of the unprecedented scope and number of its transactions. The factors that explain this consolidation 
trend are well-known: highly favourable financing terms and conditions7; renewed confidence, primarily in 
the United States , global strategies of large international groups seeking new geographic areas of operation, 
new markets and/or new products. If some financial analysts predict that there will be a break in the large-
scale manoeuvres between industrial giants from now to the end of the present decade, they acknowledge 
that this could potentially affect the United States primarily, and that consolidations remain possible in 
Europe or Asia. Several financial analysts have admitted that the moment has undoubtedly come for mergers 
between medium sized groups. 
 
None of them doubt that this second wave of mergers will affect all industrial sectors and, if the global level 
of economic activity allows, will concern European and Asia-Pacific groups.  
 
Might we presume that this trend will not spare the space industry, including the armaments sector, which 
is already highly concentrated? If we do not pay enough attention to it, this could in fact prove highly 
dangerous, given the current international geopolitical context that is marked by high levels of instability, a 
desire for power among emerging states, global governance shortcomings and the risk of the militarisation 
of space.    
 
Such is the focus of this study. 
 
This focus on the space industry may seem surprising, given the sovereign nature of markets and the fact 
that this sector (space, and more importantly, military space) remain tightly controlled by states and 
                                                 
3 US private equity funds KKR, Carlyle and Apollo)as well as European ones, CVC, Permira or Ardian are among the potential acquiring 
funds approached by the agents appointed by Safran, Lazard and Société Générale 
4 According to Thomson Reuters. 
5 Pfizer/Allergan (161 billion dollars), AB InBev/Sab Miller (121 billiob dollars) and Dupont/Dow Chemical (120 billion dollars). 
6 In 2007, transactions totalled 4,100 billion US dollars. 
7 Cash reserves represent up to 14% of turnover for certain groups, according to Boston Consulting Group. 
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governments. However, this is precisely the reason for concern as to the consequences of a development 
that this paper aims to describe.  
 
In the current context, the space sector currently appeals for a number of reasons. This should favour the 
development of the industry and attract new industrial and financial investors. However this appeal is 
primarily due to the fact that the nature of industrial cooperation has changed, and to the transformations 
that the global space industry has experienced over the course of the past few years, which have been 
unprecedented. Long dominated by government programmes, industrial cooperation in the space field has, 
over the past few years, been increasingly responding to corporate strategies, focused on emancipating 
themselves from government control. The transformation of the space industry has engendered a 
diversification in terms of markets, sectors (civilian products as opposed to military products) and 
geographical area (internationalisation compared with national products). This has favoured a growing 
externalisation movement. Although they remain vertically integrated, large space sector groups increasingly 
rely on a network of subcontractors, equipment suppliers and component manufacturers, and are 
concentrating on assembly activities.  
 
Could not it be a conflict of interest risk between these autonomous industrial strategies and sovereign state 
politics? Do States have the legal means to have the final say in the event that operations fail to comply, or 
are simply incompatible, with their national interests? What becomes of the aim to safeguard the peaceful 
use of outer space "in the interest of all countries regardless of their economic or scientific development 
status" (art. I), or the commitment specified in Article IV to "not place weapons of mass destruction on 
celestial bodies" and not to "station them in outer space in any other manner", if these "weapons" are 
manufactured independently of states in the context of transversal industrial cooperation, or placed in orbit 
with the complicity of rogue states? Over the past few years, the space sector has been opening up to new 
operators from peripheral sectors, as well as those surfing the wave of the commercial use of space 
technology. New industrial companies from widely varying backgrounds are making a forceful entry into the 
space sector; these are generally highly competitive companies, starting with Big Tech firms. The result is a 
new collection of industries, which we tend to refer to under what have become generic nomenclatures, such 
as "NewSpace" and "SpaceTechs". Do not the strategies of these industrial companies risk contradicting the 
traditional culture of the defence and space industry, particularly in Europe? 
 
The following analyses the evolution of industrial cooperation in the space field since the end of the Second 
World War. In particular, it highlights a trend towards the progressive emancipation of industry cooperation 
and of the industrial strategies of space sector companies from government programmes (II). In recent years, 
this emancipation has resulted in the proliferation of numerous Joint Venture agreements (III) and in a large 
number of mergers and/or acquisitions among space industry companies, exceeding $500 million 8(IV). These 
JVs and transactions have initiated a consolidation trend in the space industry, which is now differently 
structured around first, second and sometimes third tier subcontractors. The business operations of these 
space subcontractors generate financing needs that exceed their cash resources, and the increasing number 
of such companies calls for industry consolidation (V). These financing requirements and the need for 
consolidation could be a factor of exceptional vulnerability for space industry companies given the highly 
speculative context, where the space industry combines numerous factors that appeal to investors (VI), 
raising the crucial question of the efficiency of the control systems implemented by states in the field of 
concentrations, foreign investment and exports of dual-use technologies (VII). The conclusion provides some 






                                                 
8 According to Mergers & Acquisitions INTERNATIONAL INC. Aerospace & Defense Report 2015, 2014 in Review. 
LUCIEN RAPP, STAR[INDUSTRIAL] WARS AUGUST 5, 2016 
 
P a g e  4 | 23 
 
II. THE PROGRESSIVE EMANCIPATION OF SPACE INDUSTRY COMPANIES 
 
A brief history of industrial cooperation, especially in the field of satellite construction, shows that the space 
industry has been consistently emancipating itself from supervisory state control (even if states continue to 
remain highly present in terms of share capital and/or financing specific programmes). 
 
As Andrew D. James has demonstrated9, there has been a long tradition of industrial cooperation in the space 
field through intergovernmental programmes, particularly in terms of the militarisation of space and defence. 
This is particularly relevant for the post-war years and during the cold war period.  
 
Dominated by the United States in the western world and by the USSR in the eastern bloc, these programmes 
reflected the dominance of the two leaders in the field of cutting edge military technology and industry. 
During this period, a devastated Europe was undergoing reconstruction, and most of its weapons industry 
was either moribund or completely destroyed. In addition, former Axis powers were forbidden an 
independent defence industry under the terms of the reconstruction treaty. 
 
It is therefore significant to note that the first industrial cooperation initiatives during the course of the 1950s 
and 60s took the form of licensing agreements granted by the American industry to its European counterparts 
for the production of weapons systems.  
 
A rebalancing occurred during the course of the following decade with the development of co-production 
agreements, particularly within NATO. This rebalancing responded to the desire on the part of Europeans to 
address the asymmetries of the post-war period, and that on the part of the United States to rationalise 
weapons production, favouring equipment standardisation and interoperability. This marked the emergence 
of the "weapon family" concept. This ensured for example that in the missile field, American industry 
specialised in the design and manufacture of advanced medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), while 
European industry focused on perfecting advanced short range air-to-air missiles (ASRAAM). 
 
In the 1980s and 90s, several industrial cooperation programmes were launched that were still highly 
intergovernmental in nature and origin, notably thanks to Clinton administration initiatives. In addition to 
political, national and international difficulties, these programmes also struggled with budget cut policies. 
They either failed or could not be completed, due to a lack of public funding. 
 
It is in this context that during the 1990s and the new millennium, new cooperation projects emerged, this 
time properly industrial in origin and nature. 
 
Strategic alliances were created, both transatlantically as well as within Europe. These were created via joint-
venture agreements and the creation of joint companies and other common subsidiaries (General Dynamics 
Corp and British Aerospace, Lockheed Martin and Alenia, DASA/EADS and Northrop Grumman).  
 
These alliances preceded a vast industrial restructuring movement, marked in particular by the creation of 
the Thalès group in Europe in December 2000, then the consolidation of EADS' defence activities that precede 
the creation of Airbus Defence and Space during the course of the current decade. Powerful groups (primarily 
European) emerged during this consolidation phase. Their industrial approach is that of internationalisation, 
as national markets fail to offer sufficient opportunities. However, this internationalisation is effected by 
external growth strategies by the acquisition of foreign industries or industry branches and more specifically, 
of sub-systems, components, patents and new technology. 
 
                                                 
9 The prospects for a transatlantic defense industry, in Gordon ADAMS, Christophe CORNU and Andrew D. JAMES (edited by Burkard 
Schmitt), Between cooperation and competition: the transatlantic defense market, Chaillot Paper n°44, January 2001, p.95-124 
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On the American side, internationalisation and an external growth approach are even more necessary given 
that the consolidation of the weapons industry in the United States reached its limit, and given that there is 
a strong feeling of a growing "European fortress", based on Europe's three dominant groups: BAE System, 
Thalès and Airbus Defense and Space. 
 
Yet, these approaches are more the result of corporate strategies than state policies based on necessity and 
above all on the rationality of intergovernmental cooperation Business strategies of companies emancipated 
from state control create a the risk of disorganised industrial initiatives, guided solely by groups' 
preoccupation with their own growth and development. Although states did not initiate these developments, 
they have done nothing to oppose them. They could favour sovereign industrial policies, privileging the 
protection of national industrial interests to the detriment of an integrated industrial cooperation. Hence the 
often observed contradictions, not to speak of conflicts of interest, between the State as financer and the 
State as regulator, between civil and military space, and between the required return on investment and 
political or military alliances.  
 
 
III. THE RECENT MULTIPLICATION OF JOINT-VENTURES 
 
The emancipation of the global space industry is most evident in the Joint-Venture Agreements (JVA) and 
Joint-Venture Companies (JVC) that have proliferated over the course of the past few years.  
 
These are proven tools for industrial cooperation legal instruments, even if their modalities have changed 
significantly over time. JVAs and JVCs were initially developed to support the strategies of multinational 
companies in the post-war period. These tools were used as a means to break into foreign markets 
(distribution, local production). They then were adapted to new global market dynamics, dominated both by 
market globalisation, the rapid evolution of technology, the growing complexity of the international 
environment, and the increased size of investments and correlated financing needs.  
 
The reasons for their use in terms of consolidation strategies have evolved significantly: companies use them 
to:  
 
- encourage international co-production, while enjoying considerable savings 
 
- share research and development costs, while refocusing on assembly activities  
 
- mobilise additional expertise and integrate unnecessarily competing structures  
 
Based on a number of sources, the following table provides a non-exhaustive list of Joint Venture agreements 
concluded between 2006 and 2014. It specifies the countries and parties involved, the name of the joint 
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NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF "JOINT-VENTURES"  
IN THE SPACE AND DEFENCE FIELD  
SINCE 2006 
 
Year Country Groups Joint-Ventures JV Focus 
2014 EU/France Airbus group/Safran Airbus Safran 
Launchers 
Civil and military satellite launchers 






Research and services for launch 
optimisation systems: Launch and Test 
Range System (LTRS) 
2013 Russia/EU RSC ENERGIA/ Airbus 
defence and space 
Energia - Satellite 
Technologies 
Satellite surveillance and 
communication system 
2011 USA Lockheed Martin, URS 
Corporation and InDyne 
CoRE (Consolidated 
Range Enterprise) 
Research and services on launch 
optimisation systems: Launch and Test 
Range System (LTRS) 
2007 France/Italy  Thales/Finmecaccanica Telespazio Civil and military satellite services 
2007 France/Italy Thales/Finmecaccanica Thales Alenia 
Space 
Developer/Builder of civil and military 
satellites 
2006 USA Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems/Boeing 
Defense, space, security 
United Launch 
Alliance 
Civil and military satellite launchers  
 
 
The JV was originally a means to encourage internal growth. It has become an often-necessary requirement 
for greater external growth, enabling the acquisition of certain branches of the partner company or a merger-
acquisition, since in certain cases, the joint-venture company acquires its own shareholders.  
 
 
IV. THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE GLOBAL SPACE INDUSTRY 
 
The global space industry, particularly in terms of militarised space, has been in the process of consolidating 
for the past few years. Developed on the basis of a wide range of cross-referenced sources, the following 
tables detail the acquisitions completed over the course of the past few years by the 14 global industrial 
groups. These acquisitions are all or almost all significant in scope, given they were concluded for values 
equal to or greater than 500 million dollars. Some were realised prior to even larger consolidation 
transactions. 
 
The information derived therefrom is both voluminous and instructive: 
 
- The move towards the concentration of the space industry has been progressing since the end of the 
1990s and has accelerated significantly in the new millennium 
 
- It concerns all manufacturing sectors and all continents, even if the groups cited below are primarily 
American or European 
 
- It has not spared predator groups; some of these groups have themselves disappeared as a result of 
mergers or acquisitions; their recorded consolidations were sometimes the first step to the merger 
or acquisition 
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- Targets are all partner companies of predator groups; they are of average size and correspond to the 
objectives of acquisition strategies for business units, experts or skills, patents or industrial know-
how 
 
- Consolidation occurs by integrating those structures that have become unnecessarily competing or 
contractual partnerships that have proven ineffective 
 
- Consolidation also obeys industrial or financial objectives rather than political aims, and does not 
necessarily correspond to political alliances or even state industrial policy; however it does not 
contravene these political interests as national systems for monitoring concentrations, foreign 
investments and dual-use technology exports fulfil their role and enable states to oppose them, as 
we shall see below.  
 
 








Targets  Year  Values (US$b)  
Gulfstream Aerospace  1999  $5.5  
GTE Government Systems Corp.  1999  1.1  
Primex Technologies  2001  0.5  
Motorola Integ Info Sys Group  2001  0.8  
GM Defense  2003  1.1  
Veridian Corporation  2003  1.6  
Anteon International Corp.  2006  2.2  
Jet Aviation Management  2008  2.2  
Axsys Technologies  2009  0.6  




Targets Year  Values (US$b)  
AlliedSignal  1999  $16.7  
Pittway Corp.  2000  2.2  
Universal Oil Products  2005  0.8  
Novar  2005  2.5  
                                                 
10 Source: Mergers & Acquisitions INTERNATIONAL INC. Aerospace & Defense Report 2015, 2014 in Review. 
Targets  Year  Value (US$b)  
Rockwell Defense  1996  $3.2  
McDonnell Douglas  1997  29.2  
Hughes Space & Communications  2000  3.8  
Jeppesen Sanderson  2000  1.5  
Aviall  2006  2.1  
Vought Operations in S. Carolina  2009  1.0  
Argon ST  2010  0.8  
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First Technology  2006  0.7  
Metrologic Instruments  2008  0.7  
Sperian Protection  2010  1.4  
EMS Technologies  2011  0.6  
Intermec  2013  0.7  
 
 
Targets  Year  Values (US$b)  
General Dynamics Military Aircraft  1992  $1.5  
Martin Marietta Corp.  





Loral Corp.  
–IBM Federal Systems  
1996  
1993  
7 .6  
1.6  
COMSAT General Corp.  2000  2.6  





Targets Year  Value (US$b)  
E-Systems  1995  $2.3  
Chrysler Technologies  1996  0.5  
Texas Instruments Defense  1997  3.0  




Targets Year Value (US$b) 
Grumman Corp. 1994 $2.2 
Westinghouse Military & Elec Sys 1996 3.6 

















Essex Corp. 2007 0.6 
 
 
Targets Year Value (US$b) 
Aerospace 











Construcciones Aeronáuticas 2000 N/A 
                                                 
11 The data in italics represent mergers/acquisitions realised by companies prior to their own merger/acquisition.   
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Airbus S.A.S. 2006 3.5 
Vector Aerospace Corp. 2011 0.7 
Satair 2011 0.5 
 
 
Targets Year Value (US$b) 
Sundstrand Corp. 1999 $4.2 
Chubb Security 2000 2.0 
Kidde Limited 2005 4.2 
Rocketdyne Propulsion & Power 2005 0.7 
Initial Electronic Security Group 2006 1.2 
GE Security 2008 1.8 
Goodrich Corp. 
–Freedom Chemical Company 
–Coltec Industries 












Targets Year Value (US$b) 
Siemens Plessey Electronics 1998 $0.5 






Lockheed Martin Aerospace Elect. 2000 1.7 
Lockheed Martin Control Systems 2000 0.5 
Alvis 2004 0.5 
Digitalnet Holdings 2004 0.6 
United Defense Industries 2005 4.5 
Armor Holdings 2007 4.2 
Tenix Defence 2008 0.7 
Detica Group 2008 1.1 
 
 
Targets Year Value (US$b) 
Sextant Avionique 1999 N/A 
Racal Electronics 2000 2.2 
DCN Int'l (minority stake) 2007 1.0 
Alcatel Critical Systems 2007 1.2 
 
 







Sagem 2005 N/A 
Sdu Identification 2008 0.6 
GE Homeland Protection 2009 0.6 
L-1 Identity Solutions 2011 1.6 
 
LUCIEN RAPP, STAR[INDUSTRIAL] WARS AUGUST 5, 2016 
 
P a g e  10 | 23 
 
 
Targets Year Value (US$b) 
Marconi Selenia Communications S.p.A. (nka:Selex ES S.p.A) 2002 $0.6 
AgustaWestland 2004 1,9 
SELEX Galileo 2007 0,5 




Targets Year Value (US$b) 
MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. 1998 $0.2 
Intertechnique SAS 1999 0.4 
C&D Zodiac, Inc. 2005 0.6 
Polaris Pool Systems, Inc. (nka:Zodiac 
Pool Care, Inc.) 
2005 0.3 
Sell GmbH 2010 0.3 




Targets Year Value (US$b) 
10 Lockheed Martin Divisions 1997 N/A 
Raytheon Aircraft Integration Sys 2002 $1.1 
Vertex Aerospace 2003 0.7 
Titan Corp. 2005 2.7 
Insight Technology 2010 0.6 
 
 
V. THE RESTRUCTURING OF LARGE SPACE INDUSTRY GROUPS 
 
The above transactions hide the real transformation of large space industry groups that has occurred over 
the past few years. The elements of this transformation are now known and could lead to their widespread 
use. 
 
Formerly highly dependent on states for share capital and financing, groups have been privatised12 and 
changed their business model, drawing an increasingly significant share of their resources or their clients 
from the global market. 
 
Very little internationalised13, they diversified their markets and learned to move beyond their national 
territories, although financial analysts and other observers attentive to the sector 14  agree that the 
                                                 
12 The French state currently owns only 10.94% of the Airbus group, of which Airbus Defence & Space is only one component, for an 
equity value of 5.2 billion euros. It owns 26.36% of Thalès (3.9 billion euros), which is only one of the co-shareholders (67%) of Thalès 
Alenia Space, joint venture with Finmeccanica (33%). 
13 On the internationalisation of the aerospace defense industry, see Christophe Carrincazeaux and Vincent Fringant (Université 
Bordeaux IV), in L’internationalisation de l’industrie aéronautique-spatiale de défense française : vers une banalisation des formes 
d’internationalisation ? [   ], p.153 and subsequent. 
14 Cap Gemini, The Changing Face of the Aerospace & Defense Industry. A review of the Key Segments and Emerging Trends, 2011; 
ASD Eurospace, Facts and Figures. The European Space Industry, June 2014. 
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internationalisation strategies of the space sector's large groups remain highly original. They have few or no 
direct operations abroad; their interest in exporting is secondary to the importance of national or European 
orders (for European groups at least); few or no international mergers that compensate, in the recent 
context, the more intensive use of the Joint-Venture technique. 
 
Previously used to producing for national defence and territorial protection purposes through governmental 
programmes, groups have diversified their products. Over the past few years, they have been increasingly 
turning towards the civil market (telecommunication satellites, OneWeb and O3b Networks constellations). 
 
Although still vertically integrated, they increasingly use first, second and third tier subcontractor networks, 
much like companies in the neighbouring aerospace sector. In fact, it is increasingly the same first or second 
tier subcontractors that diversify their partnerships. They do so by transitioning from the status of 
subcontractors to aerospace builders to subcontractors for satellite builders (the Latécoère group, for 
example). 
 
The development of these subcontracting networks is the result of the increasing complexity of 
manufactured products, materials used and/or the processes used. The growing use of resin composites and 
reinforced plastic developed from fibreglass or carbon fibre; developments in terms of engines or propulsion 
techniques; the use of new energy sources; all require a technical expertise that the large industrial groups 
do not have, and which they obtain from subcontractors.  
 
In the aerospace sector, it is currently common for the value of electrical or electronic systems to be higher 
than that of the single cockpit.  
 
This movement developed significantly during the first decade of the 21st century. However it first emerged 
in the 1990s. Defence budget cuts and reduced orders for military satellites undoubtedly led to the market's 
consolidation and the concentration of the number of prime manufacturers to whom a increasing number of 
responsibilities are entrusted. 
 
This entails a double consequence: 
 
- The "pyramidisation" of the production chain, with a redistribution of technical skills and economic 
abilities along the value chain, primarily to the benefit of equipment and component manufacturers 
 
- The emergence of two distinct areas of expertise: a narrow field that corresponds to assembly 
activities, and a wider field that includes subcontractor activities. 
The vertical relationship, characteristic of highly integrated groups in the space sector, therefore depends on 
their capacity to maintain control of their subcontracting networks in the wider field, which indicates the rate 
of integration for each group.15. However, the evolution of this rate of integration over the past two decades 
has shown a significant decrease in integration, even if this decrease is less significant than in other sectors. 
Prime manufacturers have instead refocused their core business, and outsource peripheral production as 
needed in terms of orders. 
 
A certain vulnerability arises for these groups, increasingly subject to foreign control, which is all the more 
significant given that: 
 
                                                 
15 For information on integration and its evolution since the end of the 1990s, see Christophe Carrincazeaux and Vincent Fringant 
(Université Bordeaux IV), L’internationalisation de l’industrie aéronautique-spatiale de défense française : vers une banalisation des 
formes d’internationalisation ? op.cit, p. 
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- First, second and third tier subcontractors have been approved and completed qualification 
procedures required for their prime manufacturers. This makes them immediately attractive to 
industrial investors, and even more so to specialty funds 
 
- At each ramp-up or launch of new programmes, they have to invest in new production means (ramp-
up phase); this weighs on subcontractor cash resources, and they are unable to benefit as of yet from 
significant cash flows enabling them to meet these expenses 
 
- These subcontractors lack weight in terms of negotiations with large prime manufacturers, who push 
them to consolidate, to diversify their production by investing in peripheral sectors (intelligent cars 
for example), and to internationalise their markets. These strategies are the result of the need for a 
high level of capital and financing, and in turn contribute to the consolidation of the market. 
Several specialty funds are already interested in these subcontractors, or involved in their share capital16. On 
the French market alone, they have identified fifty or so potential targets on which to implement "Buy and 
Build" strategies17. 
 
Such strategies are admissible if they increase the number of mid-market companies (Entreprises de Taille 
Intermédiaires, ETI) in the space sector, thereby encouraging the participation of first-rate financial investors 
in the share capital of some of these subcontractors. They could be more contentious, and even harmful, if 
they conceal strategies of another nature, such as hedge funds attracted solely by the perspective of capital 
gains, or opaque sovereign wealth funds18, pursuing shameful political objectives of appropriating sensitive 
technologies or know-how; of destabilising dominant groups; and of controlling outer-space with the aim of 
its militarisation. 
 




VI. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE SPACE SECTOR 
 
Despite the economic slowdowns experienced by the economies of advanced as well as emerging nations 
and widespread geopolitical threats19, 2016 began with strong international activity, particularly marked by 
the dynamism of the financial markets and equity transactions. This dynamism is in large part fed by industry 
and results from consolidation or industrial redeployment strategies20. As previously noted, 2015 recorded 
three of the largest mergers in the world's industrial history21. A survey conducted by EY in August and 
                                                 
16 Apollo and Monarch own 26.37% and 26.09% respectively of the share capital of Latécoère 
17 According to Private Equity Magazine, 2016, p. 
18 Lucien Rapp, Ces fonds que l’on dit souverains. Fonds d’Etat et Souverainetés financières. Preface by Michel Pébereau, Vuibert 2010 
19 Different reports published at the end of 2015 and early 2016 predict a significant wave of concentrations over the next four years 
that should affect Europe and Asia-Pacific. These predictions are based on surveys conducted from summer 2015 onwards. If North 
or South American companies aim to prioritise investment in nearby regions or in their country of origin, it seems different for 
European (both Western and Eastern Europe), Middle Eastern and Asia Pacific companies. The top 10 countries in which these 
companies wish to invest are, by decreasing order of importance: the United States, the United Kingdom, China, India and Germany 
for the first five, followed by Australia, Canada, Brazil, France and Argentina. 
20 Added to which is the following recently published observation made by the Boston Consulting Group20: the more acquisitions a 
group achieves, the more value they generate in the long term. Over the past 25 years, companies that have developed solely by 
means og internal growth have realises an average annual "total shareholder return" of 5.6%; this figure was 11% for companies that 
have grown externally by multiplying their acquisitions. 
21 The acquisition by the world's largest beer company (Belgo-Brazilian AB InBev) of the world's second largest beer company (British 
SAB-Miller) for 104.2 billion US dollars brought the amount of transactions completed in 2015 to the astronomical total of 3,380 
billion dollars, i.e., an increase of 35% compared with 2014. 
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September 2015 among 1,600 global directors in 53 countries 22  showed that six out of ten directors 
anticipated an acquisition within the next twelve months. Europe is the main target of choice for investors, 
due to less risk and most importantly, the new euro-dollar parity.  
 
This dynamism is not restricted to industrial operators. It also concerns several financial operators 
(investment funds or private equity funds, pension funds, risk funds, sovereign wealth funds). Insofar as they 
are concerned, this dynamism is driven by a combination of encouraging factors that have rarely seen 
together over the course of the past half-century. These include:  
 
- An abundance of liquidities and diversity of the corporate vehicles that own them  
 
- The need for existing operators to defend themselves against new entrants buoyed by the digital 
revolution  
 
- Low interest rates that encourage borrowing and leveraged transactions 
 
- Geopolitical uncertainty, the brutal fall of stock market indexes at the beginning of 201623, the 
volatility of foreign exchange and raw materials markets, which led operators to diversify their 
portfolio 
 
- The need for several corporate groups to take control of strategic assets (patents, licences, brands) 
and for others to remain focused on developed countries after having been disappointed with 
emerging markets 
 
To these general factors are added others specific to the space industry, which has therefore proven 
particularly attractive in early 2016 for several industrial or financial investors: 
 
• The emphasis on dual-use industries in a geopolitical context that is notably marked by the 
accumulation of threats to the current balance of power between the world's large political 
and economic powers 
 
• The increase in highly significant - and undoubtedly disruptive - technological innovations in 
the satellite sector (mini-satellites) and in the launch sector (propulsion systems) 
 
• A latent move away from sectorial compartmentalisation, with the development of a third-
party sector that corresponds to the commercial use of space (NewSpace) and the progressive 
convergence of networks and industries from neighbouring sectors under the influence of the 
digital revolution 
 
• The development of the data market (Big Data) for which the global space industry is one of 
the main global data collectors in the field of earth monitoring and space imaging 
 
• The windfall gain of related sectors that are currently in development (such as the automotive 
sector), which offers space sector operators significant diversification opportunities. 
 
These factors explain the interest of several private equity funds, specialised in aerospace and defence. They 
consider investment in the share capital of 2nd and 3rd tier companies (component suppliers), and to a lesser 
degree, 1st tier companies (first subcontractors), an opportunity for buy and build operations, given the 
market consolidation trend as explained below. 
                                                 
22 Global Capital Confidence, 27 octobre 2015. 
23 In less than three weeks in January 2016, global markets fell by more than 10% due to anxiety concerning the American and Chinese 
economies, the fall of oil prices and the perspective of increased interest rates in the United States 
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Behind the dominant Atlantic groups (among others)24, some of the world's largest prime manufacturers, 
several smaller, 2nd and 3rd tier companies, such as General Dynamics Corp. or Cordant Technologies Inc. 
could be the object of a total or partial acquisition of their business activities, despite the protections that 
result from their status as subcontractors to the large groups cited above. Their appeal is even greater given 
they have already been approved and completed the qualification procedures for the large equipment 
suppliers or prime manufacturers. This may explain that the consolidation of the space market (like the more 
general consolidation of the aerospace market) is currently achieved by external and sometimes 
transnational growth. This creates the risk of new difficulties, particularly in terms of the valuation gap, which 
is approximately 20 to 30% between European and American companies. 
 
Beyond the United States and the European Union, how many operators from third countries could in turn 
constitute potential targets, given their ties with the prime manufacturers cited above: 
- Asian operators: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki, Samsung 
- Russian operators  
- Israeli operators: Elisra  
- Chinese operators, whose market is dominated by the Boeing McDonnell Douglas and Airbus 
Industry 
- Taiwanese operators  
- Australian operators  
- Turkish operators 
 
According to PWC, transactions completed over the course of 2014 alone in the aerospace sector grew by 
29%. They could reach a new milestone between now and the end of the current decade. 
 
It is important to repeat that these operations - those that have already taken place as well as those likely to 
take place - are part of a framework of real industrial strategies initiated by companies in the space industry 
and conducted with the support of public entities. That is the main difference that separates them from those 
concluded two decades ago, which were dominated by the implementation of government cooperation 
programmes. Given the space industry's strong appeal to financial operators, the question arises as to the 




VII. STATE SUPERVISORY OF PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS (AFFECTING SPACE SECTOR 
COMPANIES) 
 
The following information analyses three methods that states have to regulate private equity operations 
affecting the space industry sector. The analysis focuses less on the detail of the procedures required to 
implement these regulations (these procedures are relatively well-known), than on the key question of their 
effectiveness. 
 
Regulation of foreign investments 
 
Foreign investments in what is deemed a "sensitive" business sector such as that of the space industry, 
particularly military technology, are subject either to prior authorisation for each transaction (ex ante 
regulation), or to ex post regulation. These give a Government the power to oppose such investments (see 
table below), depending on each nation's specific regulations.  
                                                 
24 Boeing Mc Donnel Douglas, Raytheon-Hughes, Lockeed Martin, Airbus Defense & Space, BAE System and Thales Alenia Space. 
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These provisions are often accompanied by penalties liable to dissuade any investor who would like to 
formalise a transaction without following the procedure, which vary by country.  
In France for example, any commitment, agreement or contractual clause subject to prior authorisation, 
which has not received prior authorisation, is deemed null and void25 . In addition, the Minister for the 
Economy can require that investors modify the conditions of their transaction, or rectify the previous situation 
at their own expense. In the event of a failure to comply with these requirements, a financial penalty may be 
applied, the amount of which can reach up to double the unauthorised investment. The amount of the 
financial penalty must be proportional to the scope of the failures committed and is recovered as a debts 
owed to the State, not subject to tax and duty26. Finally, penal sanctions are specified in Article L165-1 of the 
Monetary and Financial Code, and Article 459 of the Customs Code.  These sanctions are even more effective 
given that three government entities are responsible for ensuring the close surveillance of each transaction. 
The Directorate General of Armaments (Direction générale de l’armement, DGA) regularly monitors 1,500 
SMEs. It "examines the files relative to foreign investments […]; analyses the impact of environmental changes 
on industries in the defence, aerospace and space sector; analyses the evolution of the financial and economic 
situation of small and medium-sized companies and industries; oversees relations with economic services and 
other ministries for the defence, aerospace and space industry" 27 . The Central Directorate of Internal 
Intelligence (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur, DCRI), active service of the national police, "aims 
to prevent and suppress acts that harm national defence secrets or the country's economic, industrial and 
scientific potential28". Finally, the Directorate for Protection and Defence Security (Direction de la protection 
et de la sécurité de la défense, DPSD) has a division for state interference that provides support to defence 
SMEs, among others29. 
This type of structure is not original. It can be found in several countries, where it has often been reinforced 
over the past few years.  
Does this in turn mean that there have been a significant number of refusals? It must be noted that between 
1988 and 2001, the American President has only once opposed a foreign investment transaction on national 
security grounds in the American aerospace sector, on the grounds of Exon-Florio provisions. A Chinese 
company, China National AeroTech (CATIC), planned to invest in the share capital of MAMCO30. 
After September 11 2001, in addition to the Exon-Florio provisions, the United States reinforced its homeland 
security system31. In 2002, the United States Department of Homeland Security was created32. The following 
year, it joined the management of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States33 (CFIUS). In 
2007, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act 34  created obligatory investigation procedures 
managed by CIFIUS for foreign investments in "critical infrastructure" or "critical technologies". The notion of 
"critical technologies" recalls several texts of the American regulation on international arms trafficking 
(International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR)35, including the United States Munitions List, USML.36  
Category XV of this list concerns precisely "Spacecraft systems and associated equipment"37 . Any foreign 
                                                 
25Article L151-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code 
26Article L151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code 
27Article 21, 2 December 2009 decree relative to the organisation of the Directorate General of Armaments 
28Article 2, 30 April 2014 decree n° 2014-445 relative to the organisation of the Central Directorate of Internal Intelligemce. 
2922 October 2013 decree relative to the organisation of the Directorate for Protection and Defense Security 
30Until 2001, of the 1,391 files studied by the CFIUS, 19 were subject to further investigation (45 days). In 8 of these 19 files, the 
investor decided not to pursue the investment project. 11 files were therefore submitted tp the authorisation of the American 
President, who only refused to approve a transaction in one instance (CATIC's proposed investment in MAMCO.) 
31FENTON C. R., "U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security", 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 41, 2002 
32The Homeland Security Act, Public Law 107 – 296, 116 Stat. 2135, November 25, 2002 
33Executive Order 13286 of February 28, 2003 
34Public Law 110 - 49 - Foreign Investment and National Security Act, 2007 
35 CFIUS, Annual Report to Congress for CY2014, public version, 2014, p. 37 
36 Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, 22 Code of federal regulation (C.F.R.), 1999, parts 120-
130 
37  Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, 22 Code of federal regulation (C.F.R.), 1999, parts 120-
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investment relative to military space objects is automatically subject to the CIFIUS investigation procedure. 
After its investigation, CIFIUS issues a recommendation to the President who has 15 days to make a decision 
and who may ask the Attorney General to take appropriate measures in order to ensure the President's 
discretionary decision is enforced.  
As a result of these measure, the number of transactions subject to a CFIUS investigation doubled over the 
past few years. There were 65 investigations in 2009. This number rose to 145 in 2014. Over the same 
reference period (2009-2014), the number of transactions subject to an automatic investigation increased 
from 25 to 5138. 
Whether in France39 or in the United States40, the decisions of the Minister of the Economy or the President 
can be submitted for appeal to internal jurisdictions. This is rare, but not impossible. In fact, an appeal was 
recently launched against President Barack Obama's "Executive Order". On the recommendation of CFIUS, 
this order forbade Ralls' acquisition (owned by the Chinese group Sany) of four American wind farm 
companies based in Oregon, as they are located near a military training base.41 
Finally, in international law, regulatory mechanisms for litigation between investors and States are specified 
in several investment treaties, including the multilateral Convention On The Settlement Of Investment 
Disputes Between States And Nationals Of Other States Done at Washington, 18 March 1965, 42  which 




                                                 
130, p. 339 
38 CFIUS, Annual Report to Congress for CY2014, public version, 2014, p. 
39 Article L151-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code 
40 United States Supreme Court, Goldberg v Kelly, 1970 (Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment which applies to administrative 
decisions taken even on the basis of State interests) 
41 Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., 13-5315, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Washington), 
15 July 2014 
42 Signed by 160 nations and ratified by 150 of the signatories. Source: ICSID,  List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the 
Convention, 17 November 2015 
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/List-of-Member-States.aspx] 
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SAMPLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATORY STRUCTURES APPLICABLE TO THE MILITARY SPACE 
SECTOR 
 
 National regulations System and Procedures Competent authorities 
Russian 
Federation 
• Federal law, 29 April 2008, n° 57-FZ, "On procedures for foreign 
investments in companies that are strategically significant for 
national defence and State security" amended by Federal law n°343 
adopted in November 2014. 
Preventive system: prior authorisation with special 
procedure 
• The SFA1 (SFA), which will address 
a request for opinion to the 
following: 
- Ministry of Defence, Russian 
Federation 
- Federal security service 
- Inter-administration Commission 
for the Protection of State Secrets 
United States 
• The Exon-Florio National Security Test for Foreign Investment 
amendment to the 1950 Defence Production Act, adopted in 1988. 
• The 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA). 
Preventive system: prior authorisation on a case by 
case basis with obligatory investigation procedure by 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S 
(CFIUS); discretionary power granted to the President 
of the United States. 
• CFIUS 
• The President of the United States 
Canada 
• Investment Canada Act  (R.S.C. (1985), ch. 28 (1st supp.) 
• Regulations implemented in application of this law: Investment 
Canada, (DORS/85-611) and National Security Review of 
Investments Regulations (review) (DORS/2009-271) 
Preventive and punitive system, depending on the level 
of investment and sector. 
• I < level: "Investment notification" 
• I > level: "Subject to review" 
• "National security criteria": special procedure taken 
freely by the competent authorities 
• The Ministry of Industry, advised 
by the director of investment. 
 
 
 National regulations System and Procedures Competent authorities 
France 
• 28 December 1966 Law n° 66-1008 relative to foreign financial 
relationships, codified in the Monetary and Financial Code under 
Articles L. 151-1 and subsequent. 
• 7 May 2012 Decree n° 2012-691 relative to foreign investments 
subject to prior authorisation 
• 14 May 2014 Decree n° 2014-479 relative to foreign investments 
subject to prior authorisation 
Preventive system: prior authorisation required • Minister for the Economy 
Japan 
• Law n° 228 on foreign exchange and trade (1949 Foreign Exchange 
Trade Act); 
• Government and ministerial order (the most important 
ministries): 
 Decree on direct foreign investment; 
 and the Order on direct foreign investment in 
Japan 
Preventive system: 
Obligation to issue prior notification and obtain prior 
authorisation 
• Ministry of Finance 
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• The 2015 "Foreign Investment Guidance Catalogue" (entry into 
force 10 April 2015) 
• The 2009 "Measures for Overseas Investment Management" 
• The 1 July 2015 law on national security 
Interdiction 
• MOFCOM 
• The State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China 
Great Britain 
• Enterprise Act of 2002; 
• Special rights share 
Punitive system 






 National regulations System and Procedures Competent authorities 
India 
• The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; 
• An initial Consolidated FDI Policy circular was published on 1 April 2010 
in order to harmonise policy and regulations in terms of FDI. The circular 
currently in force dates from May 2015: "Consolidated FDI Policy Circular 
of 2015". 
Intermediary or preventive system with a special 
procedure for transaction above the 49% 
threshold: 
• I <level: "Government route" 
• I > level: "Ministerial authorisation" review by 
the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) 
• FIPB1 
• DEA2 
• Ministry of Finance or 
Department of Industrial Policy & 
Promotion. 
South Korea 
• Foreign Investment Promotion Act, 1998 (adopted just after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997) – latest amendment: Act No 11535, 1 December, 
2012 
• Enforcement rules of the foreign investment promotion act of 2007 
- last parliamentary amendment, 10 June 2013 
• Enforcement decree of the foreign investment promotion act, 1998 
– last amendment by Presidential decree: Presidential Decree No 24585, 
June 11, 2013 
Preventive system: prior authorisation • Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
Brazil 
• Brazilian Constitution (Article 21) 
• Law n° 4.131 "Foreign capital", 3 September, 1962 
• Law n° 4 390, 29 August 1964 
• Decree n° 55.762, 17 February 1965 
• and subsequent amendments 
• 22 March 2012 Law n° 12 598, Strategic Defence Company (SDC Act) 
creating a new legal environment for State activities and of the market 
in the defence sector, but "this law, too recent, has not yet completely 
entered into force"3 
Intermediary system: simple declaration but 
possible intervention by the Federal Government. 
• Central Bank of Brazil 
• Federal Government 
 















 of BITs 
(Bilateral Investment 
                                                 
43 Data as of 15 March, 2016 
45 World Trade Organization. Available at: https://www.wto.org/index.htm  
46 In force 
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Treaties), Other IIAS and 




Russian Federation No Yes 79 
BITs: 57 
Other IIAS: 2 
IRIs: 20 
USA Yes Yes 122 
BITs: 40 
Other IIAS: 49 
IRIs: 33 
Canada Yes Yes 60 
BITs: 29 
Other IIAS: 2 
IRIs: 29 
France Yes Yes 180 
BITs: 96 
Other IIAS: 53 
IRIs: 31 
Japan Yes Yes 66 
BITs: 20 
Other IIAS: 17 
IRIs: 29 
Popular Republic of 
China 
 
Yes Yes 149 
BITs: 109 
Other IIAS: 18 
IRIs: 22 
United Kingdom Yes Yes 178 
BITs: 94 
Other IIAS: 54 
IRIs: 30 
India No Yes 102 
BITs: 73 
Other IIAS: 9 
IRIs: 20 
Israel Yes Yes 65 
BITs: 34 
Other IIAS: 4 
IRIs: 27 
South Korea Yes Yes 124 
BITs: 81 
Other IIAS: 15 
IRIs: 28 
Brazil No Yes 31 
BITs: 0 









- Export Control 
 
The control of exports system for products used in the design, manufacture, and commercialisation of a 
satellite is dominated by the dispute between American and European regulations. 
 
In the United States, the control of exports system is based on a delegation of powers given by the American 
Congress to the Presidency, on the basis of the 1776 Constitution. It is on the basis of this delegation of 
                                                 
44 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),  List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the 
Convention, 17 November 2015. Available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/  
47 United Nations Conference On Trade And Developemnt (UNCTAD), Investment Policy. Available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/  
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powers that a certain number of regulations have been enacted, including the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 
1976), the International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA, 1977) and the Export Administration Act 
(EAA, 1979, now repealed)  
 
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) establishes a tight system of control over the use and 
trade of sensitive dual-use technologies (civilian and military), subject to “commodity jurisdiction 
determination”. Lists of these technologies are regularly updated, in the form of the Commerce Control Lists 
(CCL). For these technologies, export licences delivered by the DDTC are required on the basis of a minimum 
threshold of 25%. The purchase of a satellite valve either designed or manufactured in the United States 
therefore requires an export licence. The American system is all the more effective in that it benefits from 
"enforcement" mechanisms. 
 
The European system is that of its member states. France, for example, uses the modified 20 December 2004 
Ordinance n°2004-1374 that specifies a system of prohibition unless authorisation is issued by the CIEEMG, 
based on the American regulatory model. Intercommunity transfers have been the object of a common 
approach and European directive (n° 2009/43). Transnational mechanisms, such as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls ensure the compatibility of these national regulations among each other 
and contribute to market fluidity. However, they also underline a difference in approach between that of 
America, dominated by geopolitical considerations, and of Europe, more attuned to competition. This 
difference in approach weakens the cohesion of the whole. The severity of American regulations, applied in 
the sense of the industrial and commercial interests of the American economy, explains the development of 
what are called "ITAR free competition" practices, encouraging European industrial companies to procure the 
components and equipment they need outside of the American market. The result is a significant market 
share loss for the American industry. 
 
 
- Competition regime 
Given the waves of mergers within the space industries since the end of the 1990s, particularly in the military 
field, states have made use of their legislative resources applicable to merger control, invoking public interest 
as justification48.  
We will recall that American legislation is one of the oldest and that it wasn't until the end of the 1950s that 
European legislation began to appear. It is even later (at the end of the 1980s) that the European Commission 
provided itself with the means to exercise control over merger operations within its jurisdiction (determined 
on the basis of their importance or impact on trade between member states). 
This being the case, North American and European legislation is not comparable, if only in terms of approach: 
if the European Commission developed a jurisprudence primarily guided by consumer interest, the American 
regulator places the emphasis on defending free competition.  
Whether initiated by American or European companies, it is significant to note that all mergers that have 
occurred in the space sector have given rise to notifications to the appropriate authorities on both sides of 
the Atlantic49.  
Some of these transactions have been the object of simultaneous investigative procedures by American and 
European control entities, creating a sort of tug of war between the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
European Commission. This was notably the case for the merger between Boeing/McDonnell Douglas at the 
                                                 
48S. MANCIAUX, Le phénomène de regroupement des industries spatiales, in Droit des Activités Spatiales Adaptation aux phénomènes 
de commercialisation et de privatisation, edited by L.RAVILLON , Travaux du Credimi, vol.22, Paris, Litec, 2004, p 129 §134 and 136. 
49Either to the Federal Trade Commission, or to the European Commission.  
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end of the 1990s50, even if it must be recognised that the FTC, unlike the European Commission (except in 
special circumstances), has in general refrained from intervening in the merger transactions between 
European space sector companies. This abstention is undoubtedly related to the weak presence of European 
firms on American soil51. 
Since the early 2000s, we have been witnessing a reinforced cooperation between the FTC and the European 
Commission, particularly in terms of mergers that have been the object of simultaneous procedures in Europe 
and the USA52. Since July 2013, negotiations have even been undertaken between the two control entities in 
the general context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, which should 
include a chapter relative to competition rules53. 
The creation of "Joint-Ventures" is at the heart of merger control procedures. Not only does it constitute a 
concentration operation in the sense of European and American legislation, like merger and acquisition 
operations54; but in addition, specific regulatory provisions 55 were adopted to cover this type of operation56, 
which is highly common in the defence space industry, as can be seen by the recent example of Airbus Safran 
Launchers, joint venture between Airbus Defence and Space and Safran57 groups. 
 
This vigilance is all the more justified given that experience has shown that the creation of a "joint venture" 
is often a transition towards a more significant consolidation process, which can in the end involve a merger 
between initially independent entities. It must be noted that the EADS group was the product of a merger 
between DASA, CASA and Aérospatiale-Matra; when the decision was taken to consolidate the companies in 
2000, two thirds of their business was represented by the intermediary of joint venture companies (JVC) or 
joint-venture agreements (JVA) that united these companies.  
The EADS example is all the more interesting given this merger of three companies was realised at the 
initiative of the states concerned, who were directly or indirectly majority shareholders58. 
The possibility of a certain number of conflicts of interest helped weaken the role of the state as censor (in 
terms of concentration control) to the benefit of the state as shareholder. This was particularly evident in the 
case of Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas and, to a lesser degree, during the creation of EADS59.  
Which the FTC expresses in very clear terms, justifying setting aside competition rules when faced with the 
need to build or defend a national industrial champion60.  
"There has been speculation in the press and elsewhere that the United States antitrust authorities might 
allow this transaction to go forward -- particularly the portion of the transaction dealing with the manufacture 
                                                 
50T.L BOEDER, G.J DORMAN, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger: the economics, antitrust law and politics of the aerospace 
industry, in The Antitrust Bulletin, spring 2000, p119.  
51S. MANCIAUX, Le phénomène de regroupement des industries spatiales, in Droit des Activités Spatiales Adaptation aux phénomènes 
de commercialisation et de privatisation, edited by L.RAVILLON, Travaux du Credimi, vol.22, Paris, Litec, 2004, p 129 §130. 
52Ibid., p. 129 §130. 
53Report of the Commission to the European Parliament, to the Council, to the European Economic and Social Committee, and to the 
Committees of the regions- 2014 Report on competition policy. 
54S. MANCIAUX, Le phénomène de regroupement des industries spatiales, in Droit des Activités Spatiales Adaptation aux phénomènes 
de commercialisation et de privatisation, edited by L.RAVILLON, Travaux du Credimi, vol.22, Paris, Litec, 2004, p 119 §115. 
55Article 1 of Council Regulation n° 1310/97: "The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity shall constitute a concentration ." 
56Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors Issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of 
Justice April 2000.  
57 For which the European Commission has just decided to open phase 2 of the concentration control procedure. 
58Aérospatiale-Matra and the Casa group 
59S. MANCIAUX, Le phénomène de regroupement des industries spatiales, in Droit des Activités Spatiales Adaptation aux phénomènes 
de commercialisation et de privatisation, edited by L.RAVILLON, Travaux du Credimi, vol.22, Paris, Litec, 2004, p 131 §132. 
60Ibidem 
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of commercial aircraft -- because aircraft manufacturing occurs in a global market, and the United States, in 
order to compete in that market, needs a single powerful firm to serve as its "national champion." A powerful 
United States firm is all the more important, the argument proceeds, because that firm's success contributes 
much to improving the United States' balance of trade and to providing jobs for U.S. workers61" 
However, concentration control is generally an in-depth procedure, which makes it an efficient tool in 
controlling concentration operations as demonstrated the failure of the merger of two large aeronautic 
equipment suppliers, General Electric (GE) and Honeywell. Had this merger gone through, this new American 
firm would have become the leader in the markets of jet engines, avionics products and other plane 
components and systems. The Americans would then have dominated the aeronautic production chain; this 
would have incurred the risk of the profound destabilisation of the global aerospace market, with the Airbus 
Group being relegated to "design and assembly" status dependent on an over powerful American supplier62. 
The Commission refusal was based on the fact that this merger "would have entailed the creation of dominant 
positions on the avionic and non-avionic product supply markets, as well as the jet engines for business plane 
market. It would have also reinforced the existing dominant positions of GE in terms of large capacity 
commercial jet and large regional jet engines63". 
The Commission's refusal not only made it possible to preserve the industrial independence of Airbus in the 
face of its suppliers, but it had the greater consequence of protecting GE and Honeywell's European 
competitors in the jet engine market, such as Rolls Royce.  
European groups have been experiencing the inverse situation over the past several weeks, with the control 
exercised by the Commission on the Airbus Safran Launchers JV project. This project is the visible facet of a 
significant restructuring project, the main object of which is the new company's acquisition of CNES' financial 
participation 64 in the Arianespace65 share capital. In counterpart to this purchase that would bring the JV's 
participation in Arianespace's share capital to 74%, Arianespace agreed to entrust the project management 
for the development of the Ariane 666 rocket to Airbus Safran Launchers (ASL).  
The DG Comp. of the European Commission have initiated phase 2 of the control procedure67 on the grounds 
that: 
- The new entity could discriminate against Airbus' competitor satellite manufacturers by influencing 
the price or other access modalities to Arianespace launch services (slot allocation, access to 
technical information on launch activities) 
- Incentives for Airbus competitors to innovate or invest in satellite manufacturing could be reduced 
- The alignment of Airbus, ASL and Arianespace objectives could lead Airbus to exchange sensitive 
information on satellites or launch services 
- Arianespace could prioritise launch services using Ariane rockets since ASL is the manufacturer; this 
could be detrimental to the Vega, the competitor launcher manufactured by ELV 
- Arianespace could be tempted to source its payload adaptors or separators exclusively from Airbus, 
irrespective of the price and quality of products offered by competitors. 
                                                 
61Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney in the 
Matter of The Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, July 1st 1997, Matter n°971-0051. 
62H. DUMEZ et A.JEUNEMAÎTRE, Concurrence: les bonnes leçons de l'affaire GE-Honeywell, Enjeux Européens, Sociétal, n°37 3rd 
trimester 2003. 
63Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement 
- Case No COMP/M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell. 
64 34.68% 
65 According to an agreement concluded on 15 June 2014 
66 For 2.4 billion euros. 
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A certain number of observations can be drawn from the information presented above in conclusion: 
- In its current structure, the global space industry, including military space, is vulnerable to the 
industry investment strategies of industrial or financial operators, actively investing in 2nd or 3rd tier 
subcontractors  
- These strategies are not necessarily the result of motives that are unfavourable to the industry's 
interests; they are a response to the capex needs of target companies, and their required 
reinforcement. These strategies take the form of buy and build operations that can be fully receivable 
from the point of view of industrial strategies. 
- Regardless of the motivations, these operations can lead to investors getting hold of satellite 
components or equipment, technical know-how, launch operation as well as surveillance mission 
skills. Although not necessarily a threat to governments, these operations can be speculative and 
compromise the efficient functioning of industries within the sector. 
- The highly advanced vertical integration usually seen among large American and European industrial 
groups within the space sector does not constitute a sufficient guarantee that these operations will 
not lead to their control from the inside; it is also impossible to rely on the fact that large industrial 
groups in the space sector evolve within sovereign-markets or still depend on large government 
programmes.   
- National powers must be all the more vigilant given that control of the space industry can give the 
entity that owns and exercises this control independently of sovereign states the means to master 
outer space and initiate its militarisation. The potential sequence to which governments must pay 
attention to is as follows: control of the space industry, control of space, and militarisation of space. 
- The means that governments dispose of to prevent this dark scenario, monitor the quality of 
investors and ensure the compatibility of their operations with the national interests of each space 
power, as well as the international interests of Humankind, are unequally effective; they must be 
exercised, and reinforced, in order to fully take into account the risk described above. 
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